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INTRODUCTION
At the center of modem-day federal habeas jurisprudence is the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").
Designed by Congress to "further the principles of comity, finality, and
federalism," 2 AEDPA dramatically changed the law of habeas corpus.3
Nowhere were these changes felt more than in the context of habeas
petitions brought by state prisoners, which represent the "overwhelming
* Andrew L. Adler is an associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. He has served as a law clerk to the Honorable Kathleen M. Williams of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, and has served the US. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit as a staff attorney, a law clerk to the Honorable Peter T. Fay, and a law clerk to
the Honorable Rosemary Barkett. In the interest of full disclosure, the author served as a law clerk
to Judge Barkett when Childers v. Floyd was considered and decided by the en banc Court.
However, the opinions expressed here belong solely to the author and derive solely from publicly
available information.
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
2. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
3. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996) (recognizing that AEDPA "work[ed]
substantial changes" to the law "authoriz[ing] federal courts to grant the writ of habeas corpus").
AEDPA established a one-year statute of limitations, limited the availability of evidentiary
hearings, erected a nearly insurmountable bar on second or successive petitions, and (most
relevant here) established deferential standards for reviewing state court decisions that adjudicated
the merits of the petitioner's federal habeas claim. NANCY J. KING ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CO-PUS CASES
FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF
1996 1 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219558.pdf; see also infra
Part I.
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majority of the federal habeas docket."4 "[E]ach year, state prisoners file
more than 18,000 cases seeking habeas corpus relief," thereby "con-
stitut[ing] about one out of every fourteen civil cases filed in U.S. Dis-
trict Courts."' And among this large swath of cases are habeas petitions
brought by state prisoners under sentence of death.6
Given the volume and importance of these habeas petitions, it is
unsurprising that the Supreme Court has played an active role in the
interpretation of AEDPA. Despite its shrinking docket,7 the Supreme
Court has accepted for review and decided a substantial number of
AEDPA-related cases over the last few years.8 But the Supreme Court is
not alone in its interest. Hearing federal appeals from Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia-three states authorizing capital punishment 9-the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit shares a deep and abiding
interest in AEDPA as well. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit publishes
approximately thirty opinions each year involving AEDPA, 10 many of
4. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIn. L. REV. 1, 8
(2010). AEDPA also affected post-conviction motions for relief brought by federal prisoners
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (imposing a one-year
statute of limitations); id. § 2255(h) (limiting second or successive motions).
5. KING ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
6. Although AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed by state prisoners after the statute's
effective date, Congress particularly "intended to reduce delays and to promote the finality of
criminal convictions and sentences" in the capital habeas context. Id.
7. See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1219, 1224 (2012) ("The [Supreme] Court decides fewer cases
per Term now than at any other time in its modem history.").
8. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013); Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct.
2148 (2012) (per curiam); Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012) (per curiam); Wood v.
Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012); Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195 (2012) (per curiam); Howes
v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012); Greene v. Fisher,
132 S. Ct. 38 (2011); Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011); Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011)
(per curiam); Bobby v. Mitts, 131 S. Ct. 1762 (2011) (per curiam); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.
1388 (2011); Felkner v. Johnson, 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011) (per curiam); Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct.
1278 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733
(2011); Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct. 2788 (2010); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549
(2010); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010);
Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43 (2010) (per curiam);
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 (2010); Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139 (2010); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009); Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009); Jimenez v.
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008) (per curiam); see
also infra notes 23-26, 30-33, 39-46 and accompanying text.
9. Notably, of the 37 jurisdictions with inmates currently on death row, Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia respectively rank fifth, second, and ninth in number. DEATH PENALTY INFo. CTR.,
Death Row Inmates by State, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-
row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
10. A search of the Westlaw "Ctal Ir" database for "AEDPA" and "habeas" reveals that the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently published approximately thirty such decisions each year since
2007. The decision to publish an opinion tends to reflect the case's importance to the Court. Under
the Eleventh Circuit's Local Rules, "[uinpublished opinions are not considered binding
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which are of substantial length and generate spirited concurring and/or
dissenting opinions."l Further illustrating the current Eleventh Circuit's
collective interest is that, of the five cases it voted to re-hear en banc in
2011,12 two involved AEDPA 1" (with a third involving a related area of
federal habeas law).' 4 And, in 2012, the Eleventh Circuit again voted to
re-hear en banc two cases involving AEDPA. t5
Rather than attempting a comprehensive review of the Eleventh
Circuit's habeas jurisprudence, this Article instead seizes on a discrete
issue that the en banc Eleventh Circuit identified, but left unresolved, in
a footnote in Childers v. Floyd, one of the AEDPA decisions from 2011
precedent," and an opinion will be unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it.
IITH CIR. R. 36-2.
11. One recent example is the Eleventh Circuit's divided decision in Holsey v. Warden, Ga.
Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1231, 1274, 1275, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012), where the second
judge in the majority concurred only in the judgment due to the sheer length of the majority
opinion. Interesting examples of spirited opinions can be found in all three of the en banc habeas
decisions decided in 2011. Infra notes 13-14.
12. Even more than the decision to publish, the decision to re-hear a case en banc tends to
reflect the case's importance to the Court. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a]n
en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc
consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." FED. R. App. P. 35(a); see also 1 -n
CIR. R. 35-3 ("A petition for en banc consideration ... is an extraordinary procedure intended to
bring to the attention of the entire court a precedent-setting error of exceptional importance in an
appeal or other proceeding, and... is intended to bring to the attention of the entire court a panel
opinion that is allegedly in direct conflict with precedent of the Supreme Court or of this circuit.
Alleged errors in a panel's determination of state law, or in the facts of the case (including
sufficiency of the evidence), or error asserted in the panel's misapplication of correct precedent to
the facts of the case, are matters for rehearing before the panel but not for en banc
consideration.").
13. Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11 th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d
953, 968 (11 th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. petition granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded,
__ S. Ct. __, 2013 WL 656034 (Feb. 25, 2013). For a summary of the former decision, see Recent
Cases, Federal Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty - Eleventh Circuit Rejects Challenge to
Georgia's "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" Standard for Defendants' Mental Retardation Claims -
Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), 125 HARV. L. REV. 2185 (2012).
The latter decision is discussed below.
14. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11 th Cir. 2011) (en banc); see generally Nicholas
Matteson, Comment, Low Savings Rate: Applying the Section 2255 "Savings Clause" to Federal
Sentencing Claims in Gilbert v. United States, 53 B.C. L. Rav. E. Supp. 61 (2012) (summarizing
and criticizing Gilbert). The other two en banc cases from 2011 involved the First and Fourth
Amendments. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999 (11 th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (addressing whether
law enforcement officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering a residential garage without
a warrant, and, if so, whether they were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity); First
Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(addressing "whether a municipal ordinance that limits the number of feedings of large groups that
any person or political organization can sponsor in centrally located parks violates the First
Amendment.").
15. Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (addressing
ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of a capital trial); Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d
917 (11 th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (addressing timeliness).
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referenced above. That issue focuses on the deferential standards estab-
lished by AEDPA for reviewing a state court decision that has adjudi-
cated the merits of the petitioner's federal claim. As explained below,
these standards-commonly referred to as AEDPA deference-effec-
tively preclude federal habeas relief in all but the most egregious cases.
The specific issue identified in Childers and examined here is whether
the applicability of AEDPA deference is capable of being waived by the
parties. Given the profound and often dispositive impact of AEDPA def-
erence, this issue is of great practical importance.
Nonetheless, the issue has not yet been fully examined. As
explained below, there are only a handful of federal appellate decisions
that have touched on the issue, and only a few of these decisions have
offered any critical analysis. More troubling is that these decisions have
reached different conclusions, reflecting an emerging circuit split of
authority on this important issue of federal law. While some appellate
courts have enforced a party's waiver without hesitation, others have
held that the applicability of AEDPA deference is not waivable. And
still other appellate courts have elected to bypass the waivability issue
altogether. Despite its general interest in AEDPA, the Supreme Court
has not yet examined this issue. Nor have scholars.
Using the Childers footnote as a springboard, this Article examines
whether the applicability of AEDPA deference is waivable. Part I pro-
vides a brief background of AEDPA deference, emphasizing its demand-
ing standards and its statutory pre-requisite that a state court "adjudicate
the merits" of the petitioner's claim. Part II briefly discusses the Elev-
enth Circuit's en banc decision in Childers and places the waivability
issue in context. Part III summarizes one line of decisional authority
effectively allowing a party's waiver to determine the applicability of
AEDPA deference. Part IV summarizes a second, contrary line of deci-
sional authority holding that the applicability of AEDPA deference is
not waivable by the parties. Part V introduces the element of judicial
discretion and discusses a recent Eleventh Circuit decision bypassing the
waivability issue. Part VI argues that, although the issue is not free from
doubt, the second line of authority persuasively holds that the applicabil-
ity of AEDPA deference is not waivable. This Article then briefly
concludes.
I. AEDPA DEFERENCE
One of the key ways in which AEDPA changed habeas law was by
establishing a framework governing-or, more accurately, con-
straining-federal courts' review of habeas corpus petitions brought by
state prisoners. That framework is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Fre-
[Vol. 67:767
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quently interpreted and applied by the federal courts, this provision
reads as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding. 16
Designed to "ensure both comity for and the finality of state court crimi-
nal convictions,"' 7 this provision effectively requires federal courts sit-
ting in habeas to defer substantially to a state court decision that has
adjudicated the merits of the habeas petitioner's claim.18
The practical impact of this so-called AEDPA deference cannot be
understated. It has recently been reported that, since AEDPA's enact-
ment, "[o]nly a tiny fraction of .. . habeas petitioners [in state cus-
tody]-estimated at less than four-tenths of one percent-obtain any
kind of relief .. -.9 To be sure, this stark figure is attributable in part to
AEDPA's many procedural hurdles.2" But for those petitions that do get
resolved on the merits, it is attributable in large part to § 2254(d),2'
which has been described as "one of the most uncharitable standards of
review known to law."22
In the last few years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
17. Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong
With It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. Rev. 919, 926 (2001).
18. Under AEDPA, state prisoners are generally required to exhaust their state court remedies
before filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
19. Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2011, at WK8 (cross-referencing NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES
FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFEcnvE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF
1996 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf).
20. Such procedural hurdles and doctrines include timeliness, exhaustion of state remedies,
state procedural default, non-retroactivity, and the bar on unauthorized second or successive
petitions. KING Er AL., supra note 19, at 45-50; see also John H. Blume et al., In Defense of
Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 435, 453 (2011)
(reiterating "the widely held belief that many meritorious habeas claims are never adjudicated
because of the dizzying array of procedural traps.").
21. See KING Er AL., supra note 19, at 58-59 (attributing the low rate of habeas relief to
AEDPA's procedural obstacles and the "more deferential standard of review for state decisions of
both fact and law").
22. Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 85, 97 (2012).
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the difficulty of satisfying AEDPA's deferential standards.23 The Court
has explained that AEDPA "creates 'a substantially higher threshold' for
obtaining relief than de novo review, 24 such that "even a strong case for
relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreason-
able."25 The Court has gone so far as to preclude federal habeas relief
unless "there is no possibility [that] fairminded jurists could disagree
that the state court's decision conflicts with th[e] [Supreme] Court's
precedents. 26 Thus, the application of AEDPA deference will often
make all the difference, especially in those difficult cases where a peti-
tioner might be entitled to relief under a de novo review.
There is, however, an important caveat: AEDPA deference applies
only where the state court has rendered an "adjudication on the merits"
with respect to the petitioner's claim. Where the state court has done so,
AEDPA deference serves to respect the dignity and autonomy of state
courts and avoids having federal courts second-guess their judgments.27
However, in cases where there has not been an adjudication on the mer-
its, then there is no state court decision to which the federal habeas court
can defer and it will review the petitioner's claim de novo.28 Such de
novo review ensures that a petitioner will receive at least one meaningful
23. See, e.g., Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343-47 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(reviewing seven such Supreme Court decisions from the 2010-11 term alone). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly granted certiorari in order to correct a federal appellate court's failure to
apply properly AEDPA's deferential standards. See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148,
2149 (2012) (per curiam) ("The [Sixth Circuit's] decision is a textbook example of what the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) proscribes: 'using federal
habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.')
(citation omitted); Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 616-17 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing eight such habeas reversals of the Ninth Circuit alone); Douglas A.
Berman, Another SCOTUS Summary Reversal Again Stresses AEDPA Deference, SENTENCING
LAW & POLICY BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.comlsentencing-
law-and-policy/2011/12/another-scotus-summary-reversal-again-stresses-aedpa-deference.html
(reporting a reversal by the Supreme Court that "once again correct[ed] a federal circuit court that
did not show sufficient deference in federal habeas review to a state court decision upholding a
criminal conviction"); Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Sixth Circuit the New Ninth Circuit (At Least in
Habeas Cases)?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (June 1, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://www.volokh.comI20l0/
06/01/is-the-sixth-circuit-the-new-ninth-at-least-in-habeas-cases. (reporting five habeas cases in
which the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in the 2009-10 term alone).
24. Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (citation omitted).
25. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 968 (11 th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. petition
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, _ S. Ct. __, 2013 WL 656034 (Feb. 25, 2013).
("Deference to the autonomy and dignity of the state courts underlies [a] broad definition of
'adjudication on the merits."').
28. Id. at 967; accord Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) ("Because the [State] courts did
not reach the merits of Cone's Brady claim, federal habeas review is not subject to the deferential
standard that applies under AEDPA to 'any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings.' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Instead, the claim is reviewed de novo.").
[Vol. 67:767
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and unconstrained opportunity to seek redress for constitutional viola-
tions.29 Because an adjudication on the merits is a pre-requisite to
AEDPA deference, and because the application of AEDPA deference
often sounds the death knell for petitioners-quite literally for those
under sentence of death-the meaning of this statutory phrase is of great
importance.
Reflecting this importance, both the Supreme Court and the en
banc Eleventh Circuit have recently interpreted the phrase. In Harring-
ton v. Richter, the Supreme Court held that a state court's summary
adjudication (i.e., one without an accompanying statement of reasons) is
presumed to be on the merits.3" Specifically, the Court stated that
"[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state
court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudi-
cated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-
law procedural principles to the contrary."'" The Court reasoned that
"requiring a statement of reasons could undercut state practices designed
to preserve the integrity of the case-law tradition" and disrupt a state
court's ability "to concentrate its resources on the cases where opinions
are most needed. 32 Nonetheless, the Court explained that the "presump-
tion may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explana-
tion for the state court's decision is more likely."33
Shortly thereafter, in Childers v. Floyd, the Eleventh Circuit sat en
banc to consider the more difficult issue of whether the state court had
adjudicated the merits of the petitioner's claim brought under the Con-
frontation Clause where it analyzed and purported to resolve the claim
under Florida Rule of Evidence 90.403. 34 Applying Richter, the en banc
majority presumed that the state court's decision was on the merits
because it did not apply a procedural bar.35 And, over spirited concur-
ring 3' and dissenting opinions,37 it rejected the argument that the state
29. See Childers, 642 F.3d at 981-82, 986-88 (Wilson, J., concurring in the judgment)
(emphasizing that it is the federal habeas court's obligation to ensure that the petitioner receives
one "actual and meaningful opportunity to seek redress for constitutional violations."). Both state
and federal prisoners, however, are unlikely to receive more than one such opportunity because
AEDPA "imposes a nearly insurmountable bar against second or successive applications for
habeas relief." Blume et al., supra note 20, at 442; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h) (2006); see also
In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 816-19 (1lth Cir. 2009) (explaining the background, purposes, and
requirements of this statutory bar).
30. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 784.
33. Id. at 785.
34. Childers, 642 F.3d at 957, 963-64.
35. Id. at 968-69.
36. See id. at 980-88 (Wilson, J., concurring in the judgment).
37. See id. at 988-92 (Barkett, J., dissenting),
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court had misinterpreted (and therefore failed to adjudicate) the peti-
tioner's claim, reasoning that the state court's Rule 403 analysis effec-
tively "addressed the Confrontation Clause's concerns."38
Most recently, the Supreme Court revisited the adjudication on the
merits pre-requisite in a factual scenario similar to Childers. In Johnson
v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that Richter's presumption applies
not only to cases where the state court issues a summary order resolving
all of the defendant's claims, but also where "the state court addresses
some of the claims raised by a defendant but not a claim that is later
raised in a federal habeas proceeding."39 The Court explained that, in
such cases, "federal habeas courts could [not] assume that any unad-
dressed federal claim was simply overlooked .. .because it is not the
uniform practice of busy state courts to discuss separately every single
claim to which a defendant makes even a passing reference."4 Nonethe-
less, the Court rejected the argument that this presumption was irrebut-
table, stating it would be rebutted where the "federal claim is rejected as
a result of sheer inadvertence" or where "the evidence leads very clearly
to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked."4"
The Court suggested this might occur where the legal standard gov-
erning the adjudicated state law claim was less protective or "quite dif-
ferent" than the standard governing the unresolved federal claim, or
where a "provision of the Federal Constitution or a federal precedent
was simply mentioned in passing [by the defendant] in a footnote or was
buried in a string cite."42
Applying these standards, the Court in Johnson v. Williams con-
cluded that it was "exceedingly unlikely" that the state court overlooked
the defendant's federal claim.43 The Court's conclusion rested primarily
on the fact that, despite interpreting a state statute, the state Supreme
Court decision upon which the state court relied "understood itself to be
deciding a question with federal constitutional dimensions" and likely
interpreted the statute to be at least as protective as the federal Constitu-
38. Id. at 970 (majority opinion); see id. at 969-70 nn.17-18.
39. 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013).
40. Id. at 1094. The Court identified three instances in which state courts might decline to
address a federal claim: first, where "a line of state precedent is viewed as fully incorporating a
related federal constitutional right," a "state appellate court may regard its discussion of the state
precedent as sufficient to cover a claim based on the related federal right;" second, "a state court
may not regard a fleeting reference to a provision of the Federal Constitution or federal precedent
as sufficient to raise a separate federal claim;" and, third, "there are instances in which a state
court may simply regard a claim as too insubstantial to merit discussion." Id. at 1094-96.
41. Id. at 1096-97.
42. Id. at 1096.
43. Id. at 1099.
[Vol. 67:767
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tion. 4 The Court explained that, regardless of whether the defendant's
state and federal claims were coextensive, "the fact that these claims are
so similar makes it unlikely that the [state court] decided one while over-
looking the other."45 The Court also observed that the defendant had
"treated her state and federal claims as interchangeable, and it is hardly
surprising that the state courts did so as well," noting that "[t]he possi-
bility that the [state court] had simply overlooked [the defendant's fed-
eral] claim apparently did not occur to anyone until that issue was raised
by two judges during the oral argument in the Ninth Circuit."46
II. THE WAIVABILITY ISSUE
While the Supreme Court found an adjudication on the merits in
Johnson v. Williams, its decision there will allow petitioners in future
cases to continue to argue that the state court inadvertently overlooked
his or her federal claim.47 This litigation will essentially require federal
habeas courts to analyze the totality of the circumstances, and certain
cases may present difficult judgment calls. Indeed, because state courts
do not always expressly or neatly resolve federal claims, it may be diffi-
cult to determine in a particular case whether the state court inadver-
tently overlooked the petitioner's federal claim or instead adjudicated it
by implication. In addition to such difficulties in application, there are
also legal issues surrounding the adjudication on the merits pre-requisite
that remain unresolved after Johnson v. Williams; the en banc majority
in Childers identified one such issue pertaining to ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims.48
44. Id. at 1098.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1099. A few days after issuing its opinion in Johnson v. Williams, the Supreme
Court granted the pending petition for certiorari in Childers, vacated the judgment of the en banc
Eleventh Circuit, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision. Childers v.
Floyd, - S. Ct. -, 2013 WL 656034 (Feb. 25, 2013). At the time of this writing, the case is
currently on remand back to the Eleventh Circuit.
47. The Supreme Court acknowledged that its decision would have this effect, but found no
reason to fear that it would "prompt an unmanageable flood of litigation." Johnson v. Williams,
133 S. Ct. at 1097. In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia disagreed. See id. at 1099, 1102 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (protesting that the majority's "case-by-case approach will guarantee
protracted litigation," "will be a fertile source of litigation and delay," and will require "[fluture
litigation" to resolve unanswered questions).
48. Specifically, the en banc majority identified (but found unnecessary to resolve) a potential
conflict between language in Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-stating that AEDPA deference "applies
when a 'claim,' not a component of one, has been adjudicated"-and the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in Rompilla v. Beard. Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 969 n. 18 (1lth Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert. petition granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, _ S. Ct. _, 2013 WL
656034 (Feb. 25, 2013). In Rompilla, the state court had denied the petitioner's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim only on the deficient performance prong of the analysis and, as a
result, the Supreme Court reviewed the prejudice prong de novo. 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (citing
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But the en banc majority also identified an equally important yet
unresolved issue that, although noted only in passing, could have alto-
gether obviated the adjudication on the merits dilemma.49 That issue
arose from the fact that the petitioner had not argued in the district court
either that the state court failed to render an adjudication on the merits or
that AEDPA deference was otherwise inapplicable.5" This failure impli-
cated the well-established common law rule of appellate procedure that
arguments not raised below are deemed waived and will generally not be
considered on appeal.5" As a result, the en banc Eleventh Circuit
instructed the parties to brief whether the petitioner's argument was
"waivable" and, if so, whether the petitioner had waived it.52 Ultimately,
the en banc majority expressly declined to resolve that issue,53 presuma-
bly because it concluded that there had in fact been an adjudication on
the merits.
But the en banc majority could have potentially found that the peti-
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)); accord Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009)
(per curiam). While dicta, the language in Richter is difficult to reconcile with this aspect of
Rompilla. Given this tension, it remains unclear how AEDPA deference will apply in future
petitions raising ineffective-assistance claims, a worrisome issue given the prevalence of such
claims. KING ET A.., supra note 3, at 5. As another example of an unresolved legal issue, there is
also the question of precisely how the federal habeas court should defer to a state court's summary
adjudication. See generally Matthew Seligman, Note, Harrington's Wake: Unanswered Questions
on AEDPA's Application to Summary Dispositions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 469 (2012) (identifying this
outstanding issue and proposing a solution).
49. Childers, 642 F.3d at 967 n.15.
50. Id. at 965 ("Nowhere did Childers argue that the [Florida] District Court of Appeal failed
to render an adjudication on the merits of Childers's claim or that the federal district court should
review the Florida court's ruling de novo.").
51. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11 th Cir. 2012) ("It is
well-settled that we will generally refuse to consider arguments raised for the first time on
appeal."); see generally Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General
Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023 (1987) (discussing the history, justifications,
exceptions, and potential reformation to this general rule); Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing
Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985 (1989) (similar).
52. Childers, 642 F.3d at 966. Importantly, the petitioner's failure to raise the argument
would technically fall under the rubric of forfeiture rather than waiver. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
U.S. 433, 458 n.13 (2004) ("Although jurists often use the words interchangeably, forfeiture is the
failure to make the timely assertion of a right; waiver is the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.") (citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). Also
sometimes referred to as "waiver," abandonment is another related rule of appellate procedure that
applies where a party on appeal does not sufficiently raise an argument advanced in the court
below. E.g., Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (1 1th Cir.
2012). Federal appellate courts also generally refuse to consider arguments that are raised for the
first time in a reply brief or at oral argument. E.g., Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11 th Cir.
2012) (oral argument); United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (reply
brief). Although distinct, these forms of waiver all produce the same result: a federal appellate
court declining to address an argument on the ground that it has not been properly preserved or
sufficiently advanced.
53. Childers, 642 F.3d at 967 n.15.
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tioner forfeited his argument. Had it done so, it would have been unnec-
essary to address whether there had been adjudication on the merits, and
AEDPA deference would have applied by virtue of the petitioner's for-
feiture. As illustrated below, there have been (and will likely continue to
be) situations like Childers, where the petitioner does not properly pre-
serve or sufficiently advance arguments contesting the application of
AEDPA deference. More surprising is that there have also been situa-
tions where the State has not properly preserved or sufficiently advanced
arguments supporting the application of AEDPA deference. 4 Unlike the
en banc majority in Childers, and as illustrated below, courts may elect
to apply general rules of appellate procedure and enforce such waivers, 55
especially where doing so will bypass difficult issues regarding
AEDPA's applicability.56
But waiver raises its own distinct set of complexities in the AEDPA
context, and these complexities have thus far gone largely overlooked.
54. Aside from inadvertence, which is increasingly unlikely given the ubiquity of AEDPA
deference, one possible reason why the State might waive reliance on AEDPA deference is if it
seeks a favorable precedent on the underlying constitutional issue. Federal appellate courts often
decline to resolve the underlying constitutional issue when applying AEDPA deference. See, e.g.,
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (per curiam) ("Our own consideration of the
merits of [the habeas petition], however, is for another day, and this case turns on the recognition
that no clearly established law contrary to the state court's conclusion justifies collateral relief.");
Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2012) ("To be clear, this Court
expresses no view on the underlying constitutional question, as we limit our analysis to AEDPA's
narrow inquiry."); Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1360 (1 1th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("Whether
we agree with the Georgia Supreme Court or not, AEDPA requires us to affirm the denial of Hill's
§ 2254 petition. We do not decide whether Georgia's burden of proof is constitutionally
permissible, but only that no decision of the United States Supreme Court clearly establishes that
it is unconstitutional. Simply put, Hill has failed to show that no fair-minded jurist could agree
with the Georgia Supreme Court's decision about the burden of proof, and thus this Court is
without authority to overturn the reasoned judgment of the State's highest court.") (citation and
quotation marks omitted); Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2006) ("In this
case, as in all cases that come to us under AEDPA, we emphasize that we are expressing no
opinion about the correctness of the state court's ruling as a matter of first principles. Should a
case in this area reach us through a different procedural avenue without the AEDPA constraints on
review, we would be free to evaluate it for ourselves."). One habeas scholar has criticized this
minimalist approach when employed by the Supreme Court. See Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA,
Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 595, 598 (2009) ("The effect of these two shortcomings-the Court's decisions not to reach
the issue of error where the lower court's action survives AEDPA's deferential standard of review,
and the Court's decision that only holdings and not dicta can provide the basis for relief under
AEDPA-is significant. Until the Court does reach [constitutional] questions like the one it
avoided in Van Patten, criminal defendants across the country may be convicted using procedures
suffering from the same identified (and litigated) constitutional defect. And, because of AEDPA
and the Court's unwillingness to apply its holdings retroactiv[ely], it will be all but impossible for
those defendants to benefit from such a future Supreme Court decision unless their direct appeal is
still pending when the later decision is handed down.").
55. Infra Part III.
56. See, e.g., supra note 48 (discussing difficulties surrounding "adjudication on the merits"
after Richter and Childers).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the application of
waiver to affirmative defenses in the federal habeas context,57 it has not
yet considered the application of waiver to AEDPA's deferential stan-
dards of review. Nor has this issue otherwise been fully explored by the
federal appellate courts. As discussed below, there have only been a
handful of federal appellate decisions to address the issue, and many of
these decisions have eschewed critical analysis.
III. THE FIRST LINE OF AUTHORITY
One line of authority would allow a party's waiver to determine the
applicability of AEDPA deference. The en banc Eleventh Circuit sug-
gested the viability of this approach in Childers. Although the Childers
court ultimately found it unnecessary to resolve the issue, it did "note
...that the Supreme Court has suggested that habeas petitioners can
waive th[e] issue" of whether there was an adjudication on the merits.5 8
For support, it cited a footnote from the Supreme Court's decision in
Knowles v. Mirzayance 9
In Knowles, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioner had argued
in the court of appeals that AEDPA did not apply, but then conceded in
the Supreme Court that the court of appeals had correctly applied
AEDPA deference.6" After observing that the petitioner nevertheless
proposed the application of a lesser "modified" form of deference, the
Court stated: "Nonetheless, because [the petitioner] has not argued that
§ 2254(d) is entirely inapplicable to his claim or that the state court
failed to reach an adjudication on the merits, we initially evaluate his
claim through the deferential lens of § 2254(d)."61 Appended to this
sentence was a citation to cases holding that arguments not raised on
appeal are deemed abandoned.6 2 The Court proceeded to address and
reject the petitioner's argument under both AEDPA's deferential stan-
dard and a de novo standard.63
Notwithstanding Childers' citation, it is apparent that the Supreme
57. Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012); Day v. McDunough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006);
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987) (pre-AEDPA). For further discussion of these cases, see
infra notes 106, 113-118 and accompanying text.
58. Childers, 642 F.3d at 967 n.15.
59. Id. (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 n.2 (2009)).
60. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 n.2 (2009).
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855, n. 3
(1996) (finding that party abandoned issue by failing to address it in the party's brief on the
merits); Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 527 (1994) (same)).
63. Id. at 121-28; see id. at 114 ("Whether reviewed under the standard of review set forth in
§ 2254(d)(1) or de novo, Mirzayance failed to establish that his counsel's performance was
ineffective.").
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Court in Knowles did not squarely or thoroughly address whether
AEDPA deference is capable of abandonment. It should therefore not be
considered to have conclusively resolved the waivability issue. In fact,
the precedential value of the footnote in Knowles is questionable. The
footnote led the Court merely to "initially evaluate" the petitioner's
claim under AEDPA, and it ultimately considered and rejected the peti-
tioner's claim both under AEDPA and a de novo review.' Thus, the
footnote was arguably dicta unnecessary to the Court's decision.65 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court did appear to suggest, even if in dicta,
that the petitioner was capable of abandoning the argument that AEDPA
deference did not apply. Such dicta is not easily disregarded.66
Indeed, other circuits have actually applied Childers' suggested
interpretation of Knowles. In McBride v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale,
the parties agreed that AEDPA deference applied,67 but the Third Circuit
independently expressed confusion regarding whether to defer to a state
court decision in the ineffective-assistance context.68 The Court ulti-
mately found it unnecessary to resolve the confusion because the peti-
tioner "affirmatively [took] the position that AEDPA deference
applies. '69 The Court then quoted the relevant language from both
Knowles and Childers to support its conclusion that, "regardless of
whether we are required to give AEDPA deference to the [state trial
court's] analysis of the performance prong, we do give it deference as a
reasoned analysis to which [the petitioner] has acknowledged AEDPA
applies."70 The Court thus applied AEDPA deference on the basis of the
petitioner's concession.71
The First Circuit employed a similar approach in Young v. Mur-
phy.72 In that case, the petitioner acknowledged in his appellate brief that
his claims were subject to AEDPA deference, but then contended at oral
64. Id. at 114.
65. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994) ("It is to
the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend .... "); United States v.
Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n. 10 (1 lth Cir. 2009) ("As our cases frequently have observed, dicta
is defined as those portions of an opinion that are 'not necessary to deciding the case then before
us.'") (citations omitted).
66. See, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (1 1th Cir. 2006) ("We have previously
recognized that 'dicta from the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside."')
(citation omitted).
67. 687 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2012).
68. Id. at 100 n.10.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Notably, this approach allowed the Court to avoid the tension identified in Childers
between Richter and Wiggins, Rompilla, and Porter. Id.; see supra note 48.
72. 615 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2010).
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argument that there had been no adjudication on the merits.73 Citing
cases holding that a party generally may not raise an argument for the
first time at oral argument, the Court determined that the petitioner's
"delayed" argument was "waived. 74 It further observed that the peti-
tioner "present[ed] no persuasive argument as to why we should deviate
from our established practice. Thus, we apply AEDPA's deferential
standard of review to both of [his] claims. ' 75 The Court therefore
applied AEDPA deference on the basis of a form of waiver and, notably,
did so without independently ensuring that there had in fact been an
adjudication on the merits.
The Ninth Circuit followed suit most recently in James v. Ryan.7 6
In that case, the State had consistently argued that the state court had
denied the petitioner's claim on procedural grounds, but then argued for
the first time in a petition for rehearing that there had also been an adju-
dication on the merits.77 As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that the
"[Sitate has waived any contention that the [state] court adjudicated the
merits of James's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. '78 The Court
nonetheless went on to find that, even if the State's argument was not
waived, there was no adjudication on the merits under Richter.79 The
Court thus applied de novo review and notably instructed the district
court to grant habeas relief with respect to the petitioner's capital sen-
tence.8 ° The State subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the Ninth Circuit's
determination that AEDPA deference is waivable conflicts with deci-
sions from other circuits. 8' Rather than take up the waiver issue, the
Supreme Court instead granted the petition, vacated the Ninth Circuit's
judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of its intervening
decision in Johnson v. Williams clarifying the adjudication on the merits
pre-requisite.82
Finally, and although not implicating the adjudication on the merits
73. Id. at 65.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 679 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. petition granted, judgment vacated, and case
remanded, Ryan v. James, _ S. Ct. _, 2013 WL 1091753 (Mar. 18, 2013).
77. Id. at 802 ("The state has long agreed that the [state] court dismissed James's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as procedurally barred. However, in a petition for rehearing before this
court, the state argued-for the first time-that the [state] court 'also' rejected the claim on the
merits in a paragraph at the end of its opinion.").
78. Id.
79. Id. at 802-03.
80. Id. at 803, 805, 821.
81. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-15, Ryan v. James, (June 28, 2012) (No. 12-11) 2012
WL 2586933.
82. Ryan v. James, - S. Ct. -, 2013 WL 1091753 (Mar. 18, 2013).
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pre-requisite, a handful of cases decided shortly after AEDPA's enact-
ment applied a form of waiver in determining AEDPA's applicability.
The Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all declined to apply
AEDPA's new deferential standards at least in part because the parties
did not rely on them on appeal.83 In one case, then-Chief Judge Richard
Posner expressly concluded that AEDPA deference was waivable:
The state has expressly waived reliance on the recently enacted
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which among
other things curtails, in habeas corpus proceedings brought by state
prisoners, the scope of federal judicial review of determinations by
the state courts in the prisoner's case. The provisions of the new Act
governing the scope of federal judicial review do not affect the sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, and are therefore
waivable. 4
In short, and despite the lack of critical analysis, the above line of
authority supports the proposition that the applicability of AEDPA def-
erence can be waived by the parties, and appellate courts need not inde-
pendently examine that issue.
IV. THE SECOND LINE OF AUTHORITY
At least three other circuits, however, have adopted the contrary
view. In Eze v. Senkowski, the Second Circuit rejected the petitioner's
argument that the respondent waived the applicability of AEDPA defer-
ence by failing to raise it in the district court.85 The Court employed the
following reasoning:
The gravamen of [the petitioner's] waiver argument is that procedural
defenses can be waived if not raised by the defendant. AEDPA's
83. Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109, 1112 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997); Huynh v. King, 95 F.3d 1052,
1055 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1996); Watkins v. Meloy, 95 F.3d 4, 5 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.); Emerson
v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.). The State unsuccessfully filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari in Emerson, "arguing that the question of whether [the] habeas
petition should be reviewed under the prior Habeas Corpus Act or under the new AEDPA, was not
waivable by the State." Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New
Federalism After the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
Rav. 337, 386 n.434 (1997); see Emerson v. Gilmore, 520 U.S. 1122 (1997) (denying the petition
for a writ of certiorari).
84. Watkins, 95 F.3d at 5-6 (internal citation omitted). It is well-established that subject-
matter jurisdiction is not waivable by the parties, and federal courts are therefore obligated to
ensure sua sponte that they have such jurisdiction at all times. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) ("'[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to
hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.' Moreover, courts . . . have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a
challenge from any party.") (internal citation omitted); Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 801
(11th Cir. 2004) ("We are clearly obligated to raise questions concerning our subject-matter
jurisdiction sua sponte in all cases.").
85. 321 F.3d 110, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2003).
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standard of review, however, is not a procedural defense, but a stan-
dard of general applicability for all petitions filed by state prisoners
after the statute's effective date presenting claims that have been
adjudicated on the merits by a state court. The statute contains
unequivocally mandatory language. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(instructing that a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
"shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding")
(emphasis added). Therefore, if the [state courtj adjudicated [the peti-
tioner's] federal ineffective assistance claim on the merits, we must
apply AEDPA deference.8 6
In Brown v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion. 7
In that case, the petitioner failed to argue in the district court that the
state court had not rendered an adjudication on the merits.88 As a result,
the district court applied AEDPA deference, and the petitioner
appealed.89 Despite his failure to raise it below, the Court addressed the
petitioner's new argument that there had not been an adjudication on the
merits, reasoning that "a party cannot 'waive' the proper standard of
review by failing to argue it."9 For support, the Court cited two (non-
AEDPA) cases standing for the general proposition that standards of
review are not waivable because they must be determined by the court
rather than the parties. 91 Notably, the Court went on to find that there
86. Id. at 121 (internal citations omitted).
87. 551 F.3d 424, 428-29 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2008).
88. Id. at 428 n.2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (See Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 262 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he court, not the
parties, must determine the standard of review, and therefore, it cannot be waived."); K & T
Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (standard of review is a
determination that the court makes for itself)."). This proposition is relatively well-established.
E.g., United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bain, 586
F.3d 634, 639 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009); Izzarelli v. Rexene Products Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1519 n.24 (5th
Cir. 1994); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1022 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As one court has explained:
[A]n appellate court must apply some standard of review to every issue it considers.
Parties frequently brief and argue their view of the appropriate standard to guide the
appellate court in choosing the correct one. Parties have this incentive because the
standard chosen often affects the outcome of the case. The parties' failure to brief
and argue properly the appropriate standard may lead the court to choose the wrong
standard. But no party has the power to control our standard of review. A reviewing
court may reject both parties' approach to the standard.
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had been no adjudication on the merits and, after reviewing the peti-
tioner's claim de novo, instructed the district court to grant his petition. 92
In Gardner v. Galetka, the Tenth Circuit likewise concluded that
the applicability of AEDPA deference was not waivable.93 In that case,
the State had erroneously conceded on appeal (against its own interests)
that AEDPA deference did not apply on the ground that the state court
had not rendered an adjudication on the merits.94 Instead of simply
enforcing the State's waiver, the Court independently asked whether
"the congressionally mandated deferential standard of review [could] be
waived by counsel[.] In other words, should this court apply a standard
of review more searching than that dictated by AEDPA on account of
the fact that the state's appellate lawyers mistakenly believed that the
more searching standard applies?" 95 Despite observing that the State was
capable of waiving procedural defenses under AEDPA, the Court agreed
with Eze and Brown "that the correct standard of review under AEDPA
is not waivable." 96 It reasoned:
[AEDPA deference] is, unlike exhaustion, an unavoidable legal ques-
tion we must ask, and answer, in every case. Congress set forth the
standard in unequivocally mandatory language. It is one thing to
allow parties to forfeit claims, defenses, or lines of argument; it
would be quite another to allow parties to stipulate or bind us to
application of an incorrect legal standard, contrary to the congres-
sional purpose. We therefore will review this claim under AEDPA's
deferential standard.97
In short, the above line of authority holds that parties may not
waive arguments regarding the applicability of AEDPA deference. The
reasoning of these cases, moreover, effectively requires federal appellate
courts to determine independently whether there has been an adjudica-
tion on the merits, regardless of whether the parties have preserved or
advanced the issue.
V. AN INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
The two lines of authority above, however, are not the only
approaches available to a federal appellate court, as illustrated by the
Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Pope v. Secretary for Department
United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted).
92. Brown, 551 F.3d at 428-30, 435.
93. 568 F.3d 862, 877-79 (10th Cir. 2009).
94. Id. at 877-78.
95. Id. at 878.
96. Id. at 879.
97. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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of Corrections.98 In that case, the Court addressed whether AEDPA
applied to a habeas petition, which turned not on whether there was an
adjudication on the merits, but rather on whether the petitioner had filed
his habeas petition after the statute's effective date.99
As an initial matter, the Court arguably gave conflicting indications
on whether that issue was waivable. On the one hand, it observed that
the State had taken inconsistent positions on whether AEDPA applied
throughout the litigation, and the Court therefore questioned whether it
had waived the argument.'0° On the other hand, the Court inserted a
footnote favorably quoting a footnote in a non-precedential Fourth Cir-
cuit decision stating that "Congress clearly intended the standard of
review of the AEDPA to apply to habeas petitions filed after its enact-
ment, and we will not hold that the appropriate standard of review is
waived just because the parties did not realize what that standard
was."' 1 1 Given this discussion in Pope, as well as Childers (and Huynh,
from 1996),1°2 there is a degree of uncertainty in the Eleventh Circuit
regarding whether the applicability of AEDPA deference is waivable.
Ultimately, however, the Court in Pope bypassed that issue. It
stated: "Even if the State has waived the argument that AEDPA applies
to Pope's petition. . . , we would nonetheless feel constrained to address
it now."'10 3 In this regard, the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he matter
of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on
appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to
be exercised on the facts of individual cases."' 04 Exercising this discre-
tion, the Court in Pope elected to "address the AEDPA question-even
if the State did not properly raise it-because plainly, it is an important
federal issue, raises a threshold question crucial to our analysis, and
most importantly, yields a clear answer."' 5 This so-called "intermedi-
98. 680 F.3d 1271 (1lth Cir. 2012).
99. Id. at 1281-83.
100. Id. at 1281-82.
101. Id. at 1282 n.3 (quoting Diaz v. Moore, Nos. 97-6586, 97-6604, 1998 WL 112526, at *2
n.6 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 1998) (unpublished)) (emphasis and ellipsis omitted).
102. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
103. Pope, 680 F.3d at 1281.
104. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). The Court declined to announce a general
rule, but stated that "[c]ertainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is
justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any
doubt, or where injustice might otherwise result." Id. (citations omitted).
105. Pope, 680 F.3d at 1282; see id. at 1281-82 ("We have said that a circuit court of appeals
has the power-even in the habeas corpus context-to consider sua sponte issues that a party fails
to preserve either in the district court or on appeal. In [a prior case], we found that we could
consider an issue sua sponte if it raises a sufficiently important federal issue or when it can fairly
be characterized as a threshold matter to another question properly before it. Moreover, while we
generally will not consider an issue or theory that was not raised in the district court, we have
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ate" approach essentially permits an appellate court, in the exercise of its
discretion, to determine whether the administration of justice and the
interests of comity and federalism would be better served by addressing
the issue, regardless of whether a party failed to preserve or advance
it. 106
Pope's approach is attractive in several respects. It persuasively
observed that AEDPA's applicability is both "an important federal
issue" and a "threshold question crucial" to the analysis. 11 7 As men-
tioned above, whether a petitioner's claim is reviewed de novo or under
AEDPA deference can make all the difference. Furthermore, as empha-
sized in Eze, Brown, and Gardner, by addressing AEDPA's applicability
regardless of a party's waiver, the appellate court would ensure applica-
tion of the correct legal standard. In doing so, it would respect Congress'
mandate to apply AEDPA deference in all cases where statutorily
required, and, equally important, to not apply such deference in cases
where not statutorily required. Moreover, AEDPA deference was
"founded on concerns broader than those of the parties; in particular, the
doctrine fosters respectful, harmonious relations between the state and
federal judiciaries."' 8 In this regard, the issue may be characterized as
one "of particular public interest or importance" justifying appellate
intervention.'0 9 In addition, whether there has been an adjudication on
the merits appears to be an issue of law capable of resolution by an
appellate court. 110
On the other hand, the particular circumstances of a given case
allowed for an exception to this rule when, inter alia, the proper resolution of the issue is beyond
any doubt.") (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
106. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 134 (1987) (employing this "intermediate
approach" in the federal habeas context of exhaustion).
107. Pope, 680 F.3d at 1282.
108. Wood v. Milyard,132 S. Ct. 1826, 1833 (2012) (referring to exhaustion); see Childers v.
Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 968 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. petition granted, judgment vacated, and
case remanded, _ S. Ct. __, 2013 WL 656034 (Feb. 25, 2013) (referring to AEDPA deference).
109. Joan E. Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and
Propriety of Appellate Courts' Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1521, 1564 (2012) (stating that "whether the issue is of particular public interest or importance" is
one of the "key factors" that determines whether appellate courts will consider an argument raised
for the first time on appeal); see, e.g., Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 801 (1 1th Cir. 2004) ("we
may raise nonjurisdictional issues sua sponte in habeas proceedings only if they implicate
'important federal interests'. . .. Determining whether § 2241 or § 2254 was the proper federal
statute under which a state prisoner may challenge the calculation of his parole date is a
sufficiently important federal issue to consider sua sponte.") (citations and alteration omitted).
110. See Steinman, supra note 109, at 1568 ("Appellate courts often say that they can decide
new issues that are questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact and 'mixed questions' of law
and fact. This position is grounded on the premise that the appellate courts' competence to decide
'pure' questions of law is not compromised by the risk that the factual record will be incomplete
or inadequate to allow for proper resolution of the new issue.") (footnotes omitted).
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could persuade an appellate court to enforce (rather than disregard) a
party's waiver. For example, while the applicability of AEDPA defer-
ence is largely a question of law, that question may ultimately turn (as it
did in Pope) on the factual issue of whether the habeas petition was filed
after the statute's effective date. And, unlike Pope, there may be situa-
tions that require further factual development in the district court."'
Furthermore, even in cases where the facts are clear, the applicability of
AEDPA may not be. As illustrated by the circumstances in Childers,
determining whether there has been an adjudication on the merits is not
always straightforward. Where present, these factors could counsel an
appellate court to exercise its discretion in favor of enforcing a party's
waiver.
Perhaps the most critical factor, however, may be whether the party
has affirmatively waived, rather than passively forfeited, an argument
related to the applicability of AEDPA deference. Disregarding such a
deliberate waiver would most strongly contravene the justifications
underlying the general waiver rule-namely, to encourage parties to
raise arguments in the district court, where errors can be avoided and
corrected; to afford the opposing party an opportunity to avoid the chal-
lenged action or defend the trial court's action; and to promote the
development of a complete record and the full ventilation of issues,
thereby facilitating appellate review.112 Moreover, in those cases of
affirmative waiver-as well as in cases where a party has affirmatively
conceded, rather than passively abandoned, an argument in the appellate
court-the "principle of party presentation basic to our adversary sys-
tem"'1 13 and attendant notions of fairness are likely to play key roles in
an appellate court's exercise of discretion.
In this respect, the Supreme Court recently distinguished between
forfeiture and waiver in the AEDPA context. In Wood v. Milyard, the
11. For example, factual issues could arise surrounding the application of the prison mailbox
rule. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (holding that a prisoner's appeal was deemed filed
when he delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court); see also Johnson v.
United States, 544 U.S. 295, 300 n.2 (2005) (suggesting that the mailbox rule applies in
determining whether the prisoner's post-conviction motion was filed after AEDPA's effective
date).
112. Steinman, supra note 109, at 1565-66; Martineau, supra note 51, at 1029 (citing Pfeifer
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982)); Dennerline, supra note
51, at 987-88.
113. Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1833; see also Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44
(2008) ("In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on
appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the
issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
present ..... [A]s a general rule, 'our adversary system is designed around the premise that the
parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments
entitling them to relief.'") (citation and alteration omitted).
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Court held that federal appellate courts "have the authority-though not
the obligation-to raise a forfeited timeliness defense [under AEDPA]
on their own initiative."' 4 Significantly, however, the Court clarified
that this holding applied only in "exceptional cases" of forfeiture, and
that "[a] court [wa]s not at liberty ... to bypass, override, or excuse a
State's deliberate waiver of a [statute of] limitations defense." '115
Needless to say, Wood does not resolve the waivability issue here.
Wood and the cases upon which it relied involved procedural defenses
available to the State and, as the Court recognized there, it is a well-
established rule of civil and habeas procedure that such affirmative
defenses can be waived.1 16 The same cannot be said of AEDPA's defer-
ential standards. 117 But Wood is nonetheless important to the present
inquiry because it sternly cautions federal appellate courts to exercise
great restraint before disregarding a party's forfeiture and extreme (if not
absolute) restraint before disregarding a party's waiver in the AEDPA
context. Thus, while Pope disregarded the State's potential waiver of
AEDPA's applicability, federal appellate courts will likely be reluctant
to do so after Wood.' 18 This resulting restriction on judicial discretion
means that federal appellate courts will not be able to so easily sidestep
the waivability issue; for while Wood counsels strongly in favor of
enforcing a party's waiver, appellate courts cannot enforce the waiver of
an issue that is not capable of being waived."I9 It is therefore important
114. 562 S. Ct. at 1834. This holding was dictated primarily by the Court's prior decision in
Day v. McDunough, which held that "district courts are permitted, but not obligated, to consider,
sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner's habeas petition." 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). Day, in
turn, relied on Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133 (1987) and Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S.
383, 389 (1994), which respectively announced similar rules with respect to the procedural
defenses of non-exhaustion and non-retroactivity. See id. at 205-09, 211; see also Trest v. Cain,
522 U.S. 87 (1997) (holding that a federal appellate court is not required to address sua sponte a
petitioner's potential procedural default, but declining to decide whether an appellate court is
nonetheless permitted to address the issue); Jeffrey C. Metzcar, Note, Raising the Defense of
Procedural Default Sua Sponte: Who Will Enforce the Great Writ of Liberty?, 50 CAsE W. RES.
L. Rev. 869 (2000) (arguing that appellate courts should not be permitted to raise a habeas
petitioner's procedural default sua sponte).
115. Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1830, 1832-35 & nn.4-5. Although the Court's reasoning on this
point was not entirely clear, its holding in this regard appeared to turn on the determination that
the institutional interests served by AEDPA's statute of limitations were outweighed in cases of
waiver (but not in "exceptional cases" of forfeiture) by the principle of party presentation. See
also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) ("Mere forfeiture, as opposed to waiver,
does not extinguish an 'error' under Rule 52(b)" of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.).
116. Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1832 ("An affirmative defense, once forfeited, is excluded from the
case, and, as a rule, cannot be asserted on appeal.") (citations and alteration omitted).
117. Only if the applicability of AEDPA deference is found to be waivable would the issue
then arise whether Wood's holding extended to the context of AEDPA deference.
118. Although Pope followed Wood, it did so by only three weeks, and there is no indication
that the Pope Court was aware of Wood.
119. As explained below, federal appellate courts will not be required to resolve the
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that the waivability issue be resolved.
VI. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION
Although the issue is a difficult one, the arguments on balance
weigh in favor of finding the applicability of AEDPA deference to be
non-waivable by the parties. In reaching this conclusion, the courts in
Eze, Brown, and Gardner persuasively emphasized two key points. First,
AEDPA deference is not an affirmative defense, but rather an issue of
governing law. 2' Where the statutory pre-requisites are satisfied,
AEDPA deference constitutes the legal framework under which a state
court's decision must be reviewed and effectively prescribes the legal
standards that the petitioner's claim must satisfy to obtain relief. Signifi-
cantly, allowing the parties' advocacy to alter this framework and these
standards would impinge on the core function of the judiciary to con-
strue and apply the law. 2 '
In that vein, Brown persuasively analogized AEDPA deference to
standards of appellate review, which must be determined by federal
appellate courts regardless of the parties' arguments or advocacy. 22
AEDPA deference can also be analogized to the legal standards gov-
erning a motion to dismiss 23 or a motion for summary judgment, 24
waivability issue in every case where it arises, but that is for reasons unrelated to the intermediate
approach. See infra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
120. Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Smith, 551 F.3d 424,
428 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008); Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2003).
121. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) ("When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the
court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.").
122. Brown, 551 F.3d at 428 n.2; see supra note 91 (discussing the non-waivability of
standards of appellate review).
123. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.") (internal citations to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) omitted).
124. See, e.g., City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two Story Vessel
Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Summary
judgment is appropriate where, viewing the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising
from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") (citation omitted),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1543 (2012), and rev'd sub nom. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla.,
133 S. Ct. 735 (2013).
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which must be applied by federal appellate courts regardless of a party's
arguments or advocacy. 25 In this respect, AEDPA deference may be
characterized as a hybrid of sorts-one part standard of review (vis-A-vis
the state court's decision) and one part substantive legal standard (vis-A-
vis the habeas claim). Accepting this hybrid characterization bolsters the
argument that the applicability of AEDPA deference is, by its nature, not
waivable by the parties.
Although these analogies are admittedly imperfect,1 26 one of the
ways in which they are so is that, unlike standards of review and stan-
dards governing motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, AEDPA
deference was established by Congress, not the courts. 127 This fact high-
lights the second key point in favor of its non-waivability. 28 In enacting
AEDPA, Congress unequivocally provided that, where a state court has
adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits, federal courts "shall
not" grant habeas relief unless the stringent standards in § 2254(d) are
satisfied.'2 9 This mandatory language, which is not contingent on the
parties' advocacy, 3 ' effectively requires federal courts sitting in habeas
to apply the prescribed deferential legal standards where the statute's
pre-requisites are satisfied.' 3 ' For courts to disregard these legal stan-
125. Cf Perry v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 664 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2011) ("We review
de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment and use the same standard of review
utilized by the district court.") (citation omitted); Estate of Gilliam ex. rel. Waldroup v. City of
Prattville, 639 F.3d 1041, 1044 (1 th Cir. 2011) ("We review a district court's denial of a motion
to dismiss de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.").
126. While AEDPA deference can be characterized as a standard of review, it is not a
traditional standard of appellate review, because the federal habeas petitioner is not appealing
from the state court's decision. Illustrating this point is the fact that, while standards of appellate
review are applied only by appellate courts, AEDPA deference is applied by the district courts as
well as the appellate courts. And, unlike the legal standards governing motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment, the focal point of AEDPA deference is the state court's decision
rather than the petitioner's claim.
127. "[Sitandard[s] of [appellate] review generally evolved with the common law ...." Kelly
Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 11, 30 (1994).
And while the legal standards governing motions to dismiss and for summary judgment are
grounded in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they have been articulated primarily by the
federal courts. See supra notes 123-124.
128. Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2009); Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110,
121 (2d Cir. 2003).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
130. By contrast, Congress expressly contemplated the State's ability to waive an exhaustion
defense. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) ("A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion
requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel,
expressly waives the requirement.").
131. The mandatory nature of AEDPA deference has been emphasized not only by Eze and
Gardner, but also by courts holding that AEDPA deference applies even where the federal habeas
court conducts an evidentiary hearing and new evidence is adduced. See Wilson v. Mazzucca, 570
F.3d 490, 500 (2d Cir. 2009) ("The standard of review set forth in AEDPA is not conditional. It is
stated in mandatory terms-habeas relief 'shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
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dards where mandated by Congress would raise serious separation of
powers concerns. 132
It could also raise serious federalism and comity concerns if, for
example, a federal appellate court declined to apply AEDPA deference
by virtue of a State's waiver. As mentioned above, AEDPA deference
was "founded on concerns broader than those of the parties; in particu-
lar, the doctrine fosters respectful, harmonious relations between the
state and federal judiciaries." '33 If federal appellate courts reviewed a
state court's decision de novo on the basis of a State's waiver-without
independently confirming that AEDPA's pre-requisites were not satis-
fied-then that could result in second-guessing the state court, exactly
the result that Congress sought to avoid.'34 If, on the other hand, federal
appellate courts independently examined whether AEDPA's pre-requi-
sites were satisfied before applying de novo review, then that would
avoid any such concerns.
Conversely, applying AEDPA deference where not mandated by
Congress would raise concerns of its own. As a practical matter, federal
habeas petitioners, a great many of whom act pro se and are unschooled
in the law, 35 are more likely to waive an argument that AEDPA defer-
ence does not apply than the State is to waive an argument that AEDPA
deference does apply. 136 If federal appellate courts were to enforce peti-
tioners' waivers unflinchingly-without independently confirming, for
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings . . . ' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphases
added)-and these terms do not lose their force because an intervening evidentiary hearing is held
in federal court."); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 950 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he statute provides
that an application for a writ of habeas corpus 'shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.' The word 'shall' is mandatory in
meaning. Thus, we lack discretion as to the operation of this section. The use of 'any' makes clear
that this section applies to all cases adjudicated on their merits in state court.") (internal citations
omitted).
132. Such concerns, of course, presume that AEDPA deference is itself a permissible exercise
of Congress' constitutional authority. This Article operates under that presumption because every
federal appellate court to consider such a constitutional challenge to AEDPA has rejected it,
though not without strong dissent. See Cobb v. Thaler, 682 F.3d 364, 373-77 (5th Cir. 2012)
(reaching this conclusion and citing the prior cases and separate opinions), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
933 (2013).
133. Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1833 (2012) (referring to exhaustion); see Childers v.
Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 968 (1 1th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. petition granted, judgment vacated, and
case remanded, - S. Ct. -, 2013 WL 656034 (Feb. 25, 2013) (referring to AEDPA deference).
134. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
135. See Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers' Case, and a Modem Case, for Jury
Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 903 (2010) (quoting a study's finding
that "all but 7% of non-capital prisoners proceed pro se") (citation omitted).
136. Cf Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-
AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas
Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 1219, 1223 (2012) (arguing that "AEDPA has shrouded the Great
Writ in an impenetrable fog" through which pro se petitioners are unable to navigate).
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example, that there was an adjudication on the merits-then that could
result in the application of AEDPA deference in cases where Congress
did not so require or intend.137 If, however, federal appellate courts were
to ensure independently that AEDPA's pre-requisites were satisfied
before applying its deferential standards, then that would avoid such
concerns.
Thus, requiring federal appellate courts to determine independently
AEDPA's applicability would both avoid constitutional concerns 138 and
ensure that Congress' intent was effectuated in every case. Moreover, as
a practical matter, it would also remove from the equation judicial dis-
cretion and concomitant uncertainty in the law. In this regard, one com-
mentator has criticized
the failure or inability of appellate courts to articulate any principled
basis for determining when and under what circumstances a new
issue will be considered. As a result, it is almost impossible to predict
in a particular case whether or not the appellate court will consider a
new issue raised by the appellant. This uncertainty reduces the value
of being the successful party in the trial court and adds to the already
overwhelming caseload of American appellate courts by encouraging
appeals. Further, in many appeals, which would have been taken in
any event, it can add two issues: whether or not to consider the new
issue, as well as the merits of the issue itself.1 3
9
Such practical problems would be mitigated if federal appellate courts
were required to examine independently AEDPA's applicability, regard-
less of a party's waiver. Removing judicial discretion in this regard
would also preclude any argument that courts were enforcing or disre-
garding waivers in an inequitable fashion.
137. If that were to occur, petitioners would be deprived of one meaningful opportunity to seek
redress for constitutional violations at the trial level. Although beyond the scope of this Article,
and by no means clear, this deprivation could potentially raise concerns under the Suspension
Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. For competing views in the Eleventh Circuit on the scope of
the Suspension Clause, compare Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1324-29 (11th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (Pryor, J., concurring), with id. at 1329-30 (Barkett, J., dissenting), and id. at
1330-36 (Martin, J., dissenting), and id. at 1336-37 (Hill, J., dissenting). In addition, and
according to one commentator, this deprivation could raise due process concerns as well. See
Justin F. Marceau, Don't Forget Due Process: The Path (Not Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas
Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 7 (2010) (arguing that AEDPA deference violates due
process "where a prisoner has not received a full and fair review of his constitutional claims,
either in state or federal court").
138. This is consistent with the canon of constitutional avoidance. See Spector Motor Serv. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any
other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable."); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (explaining that "[t]he Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question" if the case can be decided on other grounds).
139. Martineau, supra note 51, at 1024.
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To be sure, requiring an independent judicial examination of
AEDPA's applicability has costs. It would add to the already heavy wor-
kload of the federal appellate courts, 140 but the effect should be rela-
tively modest. There are many cases presenting waiver issues that would
ultimately not require additional judicial effort. For example, there will
be cases where the court ultimately finds that the party did sufficiently
preserve or advance an argument related to the applicability of AEDPA
deference.' 41 There will also be cases like Childers, where the poten-
tially waived argument lacks merit and the appellate court would prefer
to address (and reject) that argument regardless of any potential
waiver. 4 2
More importantly, federal appellate courts need not definitively
resolve AEDPA's applicability either in those (not uncommon) cases
where the petitioner's claim fails under a de novo review or in those
(less common) cases where petitioner's claim satisfies AEDPA's defer-
ential standards. At those two extremes, the applicability of AEDPA def-
erence would not affect the outcome of the case. Rather, resolution
would be required only in those truly difficult (and important) cases
where the petitioner's claim might prevail under a de novo review but
fails under AEDPA deference.'43
Furthermore, in cases where a party has not advanced an argument
relating to AEDPA's applicability, this failure will likely be due in many
instances to the fact that the issue is beyond peradventure. Whether the
habeas petition has been filed after AEDPA's effective date is an objec-
tive fact generally discernible from the face of the petition."4 And while
there remain difficult cases like Childers at the margins, determining
whether the petitioner's claim has been adjudicated on the merits will
140. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DuKE L.J. 315, 321-25 (2011).
141. See, e.g., Langston v. Smith, 630 F.3d 310, 314 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Langston's argument
that the State waived its entitlement to section 2254(d) deference is unpersuasive. Even if we
assume that this standard of review is waivable, the State's ambiguous statements to the district
court ... cannot reasonably be construed as a waiver.").
142. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1100 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2012) ("We need not
decide whether Respondent waived the AEDPA argument because, as explained in text, we hold
that the argument fails on its merits.").
143. At the same time, addressing the issue may also be preferable in cases where, although
not required to resolve the case, the application of AEDPA deference would simplify the legal
analysis.
144. There are, of course, exceptions. In addition to the mailbox rule example noted above,
supra note 111, another example is reflected in the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Pope that
AEDPA applies "where a petition filed before April 1996 [the effective date] was dismissed
without prejudice for non-exhaustion or on other procedural grounds and the petitioner filed an
amended petition after April 1996." Pope v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11 th Cir.
2012).
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often be established.' 45 Thus, requiring a federal appellate court to
double-check the applicability of AEDPA should, in many cases,
amount to a relatively modest task, akin to ensuring federal subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction where neither party has disputed it. 146
The primary cost, rather, of requiring federal appellate courts to
examine independently AEDPA's applicability is that it would under-
mine the policies underlying the general rule of waiver. Thus, it could
conceivably discourage arguments related to AEDPA's applicability
from being raised and resolved in the district court, prejudice the non-
waiving party, and render appellate review more difficult.'47 Addition-
ally, and as Wood indicates, requiring an independent judicial examina-
tion where there has been a deliberate waiver or concession would
contravene the adversarial principle of party presentation and offend
notions of fairness. These are plainly important considerations."'
But these considerations are no stranger to sacrifice.' 49 They are
most familiarly and frequently subordinated to the obligation of federal
courts to inquire into the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. That
obligation is paramount and not waivable because it "serve[s] as an
internal apparatus preserving separation of powers and limit[s] federal
court activity to the domain assigned by the Constitution."15 Although
presenting different considerations, requiring appellate courts to
examine independently the applicability of AEDPA deference would
also preserve the separation of powers. It would ensure that courts prop-
erly construe and apply governing law, fulfilling their role in the consti-
tutional order and effectuating the intent of Congress. And, in doing so,
145. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REv. 953, 960 (2012)
(noting that the "great majority of claims" are adjudicated on the merits in state court).
146. See supra note 84 (explaining that subject-matter jurisdiction is not waivable by the
parties).
147. But see Dennerline, supra note 51, at 989-90 (asserting that "[tihe main problem with the
modem justification is that the [general waiver] rule does not actually encourage the raising of
issues in the trial court").
148. However, appellate courts independently examining the applicability of AEDPA
deference can somewhat restore the adversarial principle of party presentation by affording the
parties notice of the issue and an opportunity to brief it. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198,
210 (2006) ("Of course, before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair
notice and an opportunity to present their positions."); Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith,
Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REv.
245, 251 (2002) (arguing that appellate courts raising issues sua sponte must afford the parties an
opportunity to brief the issue).
149. See Justin Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 41-42 (2012)
(arguing that, although the American legal system is primarily adversarial, it contains "numerous
inquisitorial features"); id. at 42-43 (providing examples of appellate courts raising issues sua
sponte); Milani & Smith, supra note 148, at 248 ("[R]aising issues sua sponte is not an uncommon
practice.").
150. Pidot, supra note 149, at 36.
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it would safeguard the important yet delicate balance struck in § 2254(d)
between federalism (by respecting the judgment of state courts) and
individual rights (by ensuring state prisoners one unconstrained opportu-
nity to seek redress for constitutional violations). Allowing a party's
waiver to determine the applicability of AEDPA deference would
threaten that balance and the constitutional interests it embodies.
CONCLUSION
While the correct resolution of the waivability issue is subject to
reasonable debate, that debate has surprisingly been slow to commence.
As explained above, only a handful of federal appellate decisions have
analyzed the issue, while the remaining decisions that touch on the issue
have either bypassed it or applied a form of waiver without critical anal-
ysis.15' Perhaps due to the ad hoc approach taken by some appellate
courts, there is now a lack of uniformity on the waivability issue
between the circuits, and arguably within the Eleventh Circuit. This dis-
harmony and unpredictability is troubling given that a party's waiver can
determine the applicability of AEDPA deference, which often plays a
dispositive role in the evaluation of federal habeas petitions filed by
state prisoners, including those under sentence of death. Thus, just as it
is critically important to define AEDPA's key statutory pre-requisite
(i.e., "adjudication on the merits"), so too is it important to resolve
whether the applicability of AEDPA deference is waivable. Although
this Article has suggested a negative resolution to that issue, it has, at the
very least, sought to ignite the debate by highlighting the issue's impor-
tance, framing its analysis, and unearthing some of its complexities.
151. In this regard, the cases in the first of line of authority do not acknowledge the difficulties
with applying waiver in the unique context of AEDPA deference. See supra Part 11. This weakens
the persuasive force of those decisions. Moreover, the decisions in that line of authority issued
shortly after AEDPA's enactment came at a time before the nature and impact of AEDPA
deference was fully apparent. See Marceau, supra note 22, at 88 ("[A] [l]eading habeas corpus
scholar... characterized the first decade of AEDPA litigation as substantial 'hype' without any
serious 'bite.' Both in terms of doctrinal shifts and recent empirical data, much has changed. The
harshness of AEDPA's restrictions has come into focus over the past five years [preceding
2012].") (footnote omitted).
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